Imagination at the center of moral action: developing a deeper understanding of how to educate for teacher excellence

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Abstract. It is not uncommon to find arguments for why teaching is a moral practice in which the virtues and wise judgment of a teacher play a prominent role. What is less often explored are the ways in which an aesthetic element - imagination - plays a part in this. From a practical perspective, this enacted teaching is often accessible, in retrospect, through narratives. This paper will begin with a short outline of the general issue from an Aristotelian perspective. This is briefly related to Rudolf Steiner’s concepts of moral intuition, imagination and technique as well as Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetic philosophy. Following that, I will be concerned with a discussion of ways in which this can be realized as part of a teacher education curriculum, focusing especially on the practical aspects of this kind of knowledge and on its imaginative-aesthetic character. The results are a richer conceptualization of what virtue and good judgment entail and suggestions for how this can be made part of teacher training.

Keywords Pedagogical imagination; Practical knowledge; Phronesis; Narrative.

1. Introduction

That teaching is largely a moral or ethical practice has been recognized, at least implicitly, in reform pedagogy since Pestalozzi and Rousseau, and it is not difficult to follow this educational view back into antiquity through Plato and Cicero (Rittelmeyer, 2012). However, the issue has also seen a wider scholarly discussion over the past two or three decades, with a recent increase in considerations of teaching from an Aristotelian perspective (eg. Biesta, 2014; Bondi et al. eds., 2011; Carr, 2006, 2003, 1999; Campbell, 2013; Dunne, 1993; Green, 2011; Kemmis & Smith eds., 2007; Kinsella & Pitman eds., 2012; Sockett, 2012; van Manen, 1995, 1991). A significant part of that discussion has been a matter of distinguishing between two aspects or kinds of knowledge: craft-like, practical knowledge, and wise judgment or prudence. Furthermore, it has been noted recently that especially practical wisdom or prudence/judgment, through its situational character, is essentially a narrative kind of knowledge when articulated (Gallagher, 2013; Noel, 1999; Tyson, 2015a, b, 2014).

The narrative dimension that prudence/judgment shares on a more general level with practical knowledge-forms indicates its aesthetic character (Noel, 1999; Tyson, 2015a). Beyond narratives specifically, this is a matter of recognizing that any interpretation of a situation requires an aesthetic judgment, a decision regarding what to attend to and what to disregard (Heron & Reason, 1997). Furthermore the recognition that a situation is ethically or morally charged also demands an imaginative response, ie. there is seldomly,
perhaps never, an unambiguous response that follows logically from a situation. Rather, it is an imaginative act to find a more or less adequate response. Considering the aesthetic source of moral action, there are several ways in which teacher training can engage with it: through including aesthetic subjects as part of a training curriculum, through extended practical immersion of teacher-students in educational activity where virtues are practiced and reflected upon, and also through the recounting of narratives of wise judgment/prudence. Such narratives can be used as sources for mutual reflection and as an education of one’s narrative imagination (cf. Tyson, 2015b).

However, if the call for attention to these issues is part of a wider scholarly discussion, their practical realization in teacher training for primary and secondary education around the world seems to be underdeveloped in the narrative area. At least scholarly conversation is far more extensive on philosophical grounds than any empirical counterpart, exceptions mostly being found in training programs for nurses and similar care-oriented professions (cf. eg. Charon, 2006). This may be, in part, as Schön (1983) remarked thirty years ago, due to our academic institutions sharing a “selective inattention to practical competence and professional artistry” (ibid:vii). To put it briefly here, practical knowledge gained through experience is not (primarily) a matter of general statements but rather, if it is to be articulated, a matter best expressed in narrative descriptions. It is through a sufficient diversity of narratives covering an issue that we gain articulated knowledge of practice, not by summarizing them into categories taken out of their context.

I will deal with these questions first by discussing teaching as a matter of practical knowledge as it is most commonly conceptualized using Aristotle and then turning to what might be gained through the addition of Rudolf Steiner’s and Friedrich Schiller’s thoughts. Having done that, I will conclude the conceptual investigation by discussing what narratives as a form of knowledge have to offer in this context. From there, I will turn to the realization of these matters in teacher education programs, using a pilot project recently launched at the Waldorf Teacher’s College in Stockholm as one example, and drawing on previous research for two more. I will round things out with some concluding thoughts.

2. Excellence in teaching: the Aristotelian debate

Aristotle looms large in the past three decades of debate concerning practical knowledge (Macintyre, 2007; Dunne, 1993; Carr, 2006, 2003). This partly has to do with his distinctions between the art of making (techne), practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis) and moral virtue (praxis). These were made most explicitly (although not exclusively) in the Nichomachean Ethics (2009), the foundation for the following considerations. The debate is far from simple and I have discussed it more extensively recently (Tyson, 2015a, b). Here I will limit myself to a short characterization of what these concepts mean in relation to what a teacher does when teaching and thus what teacher training needs to take into account.

To begin with, teaching can be understood as a techne, which basically means a professional activity (Squires, 2003). Aristotle, among others, uses the examples of medicine and navigation to characterize what technai are. In this respect, teaching as a craft-like activity contains aspects that can only be gained through experience (extensive parts of didactics essentially), as well as other aspects that can and need to be gained through study, ie. they can be put down in writing. This is no different from any complex craft-like activity which requires both practice and experience1 as well as study (not necessarily study from books, any verbalized form will do). But teaching is also, and perhaps foremost, a matter of human interaction and communication. As such it can be understood as an ethical activity for which the term excellence is sometimes used.

1. There is a subtle difference between practice and experience as understood here. In one sense it corresponds to that between being skilled and being a connoisseur as Polanyi has discussed (Dormer, 1994). Thus, practice is required in order to become proficient manually and cognitively, and this is a matter that includes experiencing a sufficient number of situations but also of recalibrating oneself through repeated action. Experience in the sense of having lived through many variations of a situation or line of work is possible to achieve/suffer passively, and is more closely connected with a depth of perception. So in another sense, practice denotes an active, intentional repetition of some action, whereas experience points to a more passive reception of a process. Practice includes experience to a degree, but also tends to focus attention on a specific aspect of something, whereas a more observing stance has an easier time grasping a larger context.
I understand excellence as a combination of moral virtue and good judgment or practical wisdom. A comparable concept for techne would be expertise, thus one may speak of an expert teacher without that person necessarily being a particularly excellent teacher, i.e. he or she might be very capable of teaching his or her subject, but incapable of dealing with conflict, moral issues arising from students’ backgrounds, etc. Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtues such as kindness or charity or, in a more abstract sense, the capacity to navigate between excesses (e.g. being cowardly or foolhardy rather than brave). His point is that moral virtue can only develop through practicing it: kindness is begot by kindness and so forth. Thus, the development of moral virtues in teachers is necessarily a matter of practice. Theoretical knowledge about virtues is close to useless. However, a caveat can certainly be made here about the importance of shared reflection, in which virtuous and vicious actions are discussed. This has to do with our sometimes imprecise or gratuitous concepts of different virtues. What amounts to bravery might be subject to considerable disagreement and, to use a modern term, someone might labor under the false consciousness that what he or she is doing is brave, when most others would consider it foolhardy instead. Even though no logically binding solutions can be found to many such issues, a teacher that is not used to reflecting on and questioning her practice risks acting naïvely, and moral naïveté, i.e. the unreflected assumption that one is acting with virtue on the simple basis of having a good intention, might well be considered a vice.

The central concept introduced by Aristotle (2009) in respect to the present inquiry is the intellectual virtue of phronesis, variously translated as practical wisdom or prudence. He characterizes it as the capacity to deliberate wisely about what course of action to take in order that a moral virtue be well exercised. There is simply no given reason why a courageous person, for instance, should know automatically how to be courageous in a situation; this requires wise deliberation, although that might be giving it an overly reflective characterization. Often the situation is perceived and action is immediate, thus conflating moral virtue and phronesis. Aristotle’s distinction is important however, since phronesis, although largely a matter of experience, is also accessible through narratives of other people’s wise deliberation. This was, to my knowledge, not explicitly recognized by Aristotle. He argued that only old people can be wise, since youth is the opposite of extensive experience. I doubt if phronesis could be gained simply through the study of the wise deliberations of others, but I do believe that these could significantly contribute to it, something I will return to in the section on narrative forms of knowledge. For the time being, having introduced Aristotle’s thoughts and the concept of excellence as a combination of moral virtue and practical wisdom, I will move on to discuss a further series of concepts that intersect with Aristotle’s.

3. Rudolf Steiner’s moral concepts

Rudolf Steiner, in the second part of The Philosophy of Freedom (2013), makes three relevant distinctions that can be brought in relation to the Aristotelian ones. He understands moral action as drawing on three different sources: intuition, imagination (Phantasie, fantasy) and technique. He characterizes intuitions as our fundamental compass, writing that the Laws of Moses or the Golden Rule (do unto others…) are examples of moral intuitions. I would add here that we might consider the major part of Allgemeine Menschenkunde or several other cycles of pedagogical lectures as formulations of pedagogical intuitions that often conflate with moral ones. Intuitions then, are thoughts (or perhaps better: ideas) that can be had (perceived) either immediately in a moral/pedagogical situation or, as the above examples show, either by having access to the intuitions of others or by remembering one’s own previous intuitions.

However, intuitions are ambiguous in relation to practice, i.e. they allow for far more than one interpretation in any specific case of action, judgment or curriculum design. For this we need moral/pedagogical imagination in order to, through a fundamentally aesthetic activity, find ways to bring the particularity of a situation together with the openness of an intuition, to imagine a wise course of action. Finally, even though we may very well have a good idea of what could be done, we may still lack the practical technique (skill, capability) required to do it. A teacher may be too didactically unskilled to be able to effect a beautiful imagination in the practical environment of a workshop or classroom. Conversely, a very morally skilled teacher (as Steiner notes in a general sense) may take another’s imagination and make it a reality.
A similar understanding of moral action as dependent on moral imagination seems to be rare in philosophy (one recent exception drawing on John Dewey is Fesmire, 2003). Bringing this concept together with Aristotle’s concepts affords them an added depth that is often lacking. This is perhaps most forcefully the case with regard to moral intuition, since much of the neo-Aristotelian discussion simply ignores the conceptual side of moral action, ie. it underplays the need for ethical concepts, even though these serve at the very least to drive moral action towards action rather than reaction. With this, I mean that a lack of cognitive activity and a reliance on experience and disposition implies a lack also of moral imagination, because such imagination requires both the concept/intuition and the percept or situation (which will become even more clear in the next section on Schiller, who calls these “form” and “sense”). Practical wisdom conflates or combines what Steiner separates, namely moral intuition, moral imagination and moral technique. Being wise, one might well argue, it is a matter of having beautiful or rich intuitions; being practical is a matter of having a combination of imagination and deliberative technique.

These virtues have been discussed recently in terms of dispositions to act in a certain way (Sockett, 2012) evoking a sense of established habits. In this sense, one might characterize the moral virtues of teachers as dispositions established through repeated exercise of moral imagination and moral technique. For the present inquiry, what Steiner contributes most forcefully is the importance of moral imagination, underscoring the aesthetic aspect of wise judgment and virtuous action (to be fair, Aristotle writes of imagination or phantasia as well, and Noel elaborates on its relation to phronesis (1999), but that is something I will leave for a separate discussion). This brings me to the next section, where Friedrich Schiller’s aesthetic philosophy adds a further layer.

4. The aesthetic source of moral action in Man

The above considerations receive further substance through Schiller’s philosophical anthropology as it was set down in his Aesthetic Letters (1795 [2010]). I have discussed these at some length recently (Tyson, 2014) and will limit myself to a very brief sketch in order to move onto the more salient points in connection with the present inquiry.

Schiller, following Kant, argues that we are born into a polarity between matter/sense and idea/form. He calls these the “sense drive” and the “form drive” respectively, thereby indicating that they are present as urges or processes in the human being. In both, we are equally bound to laws beyond our making, the form-drive through the given of logic and the sense drive through the given of percepts, to put it very succinctly. However, we are capable of bringing them together in a third, new expression, the play or aesthetic drive. In play we are no longer determined by sense and form and, since play is functionally identical to aesthetic activity, he can write (2010:70, my translation):

Through beauty, the sensory [embodied] human being is led to form and to thinking; through beauty the spiritual human being is brought back to matter and given back to the world of sense.

Moral imagination (phantasie) is about finding the beautiful solution or course of action and thereby leading the practical dilemma or unique moral situation into form, and at the same time bringing the intuition back to matter, giving it back to the world of sense, as he writes so eloquently. In practice, I would argue, we do this most often through narratives or stories because they mediate between intuition and experience. Thus they serve as a bridge leading us from experience back to intuition and from intuition into experience. As an aside, but an important one, Goethe wrote The Fairy Tale of the Beautiful Lily and the Green Snake as a direct response to Schiller’s letters (Safranski, 2009; Steiner, 1982) and the themes Schiller considers abstractly are given life there as narrative. I can see no better illustration of the heights to which narrative can rise, because in art, form and life do not mutually cancel each other out. Moral action without life cannot heal, and without form it is blind.

One further point needs to be made, since the heading reads: the aesthetic source of moral action in Man. Schiller’s genius lies partly in him recognizing and arguing that it is through aesthetic activity or play that we become ourselves, ie. where the source of our individual becoming lies. Schiller (2010:62f):
“Man only plays when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only completely a man when he plays”. Thus form or intuition can be the source of our morality in one sense, by providing us with the conceptual content of our moral deliberation. However, the source of moral action or the actualization of this cognition is (or needs to be) the aesthetic activity through which we return to ourselves and become ourselves ever more. If a moral intuition is not actualized through an imaginative (aesthetic) process but, instead, brought immediately to bear on a situation, the result is a reversal. This has been discussed by Ben Aharon (2011), drawing on Deleuze, where more or less the opposite of what is intended/thought is realized. Moral imagination, then, is at the center of wise deliberation, and virtuous action and pedagogical imagination is at the center of educational action or Bildung.

Until now, I have been concerned with clarifying what excellence means and the central importance of moral imagination and other aesthetic activity in ethical action. The bridge from this conceptual work to empirical research is what I turn my attention to next in discussing narratives as a form of knowledge.

5. The place of stories in practical knowledge forms

Returning to the initial discussion of Aristotle’s concepts techne and phronesis, both are characterized as practical and thus experiential, situational and context-dependent. Within the field of narrative inquiry, the past three decades have seen a strong argument develop regarding the potential of narratives to surface and articulate practical knowledge (Bruner, 1991; Caduri, 2013; Connelly & Clandinin, 1995, 1990; Gallagher, 2013; Lewis, 2011; Worth, 2008). The basic reason for this is that a story can retain much of the context and particularity of a situation while at the same time teasing out the relevant themes and highlighting them. This is essentially an aesthetic activity and thus from the very beginning there is an overlap between narrative and moral imagination.

There are, however, several issues with narrative knowledge, issues I discuss more in depth in an upcoming article (Tyson 2015b). In short, the most immediate ones are arbitrariness and literalness as the two extremes of interpreting narratives. There is also a tendency to generalize from single cases that needs to be held back for the most part and there are issues with taking stories out of their oral context and writing them down, thereby already significantly decontextualizing and depersonalizing them.

Regarding their potential, narratives are both context-sensitive and fundamentally aesthetic. Thus they unify two of the most relevant characteristics of excellence, particularly its phronesis aspect. They also have the dual potential of being mediators of knowledge related to phronesis and acts of phronesis and moral virtue when, in some context, telling the right story could be an instance of ethical action. Thus although narrative forms of knowledge are fraught with several issues that need to be taken seriously, good stories of moral action and deliberation are well suited to function as sources of articulated moral and pedagogical imagination. This is first and foremost a practitioner-oriented perspective, but in the field of systematic research the potential of gaining insight into variations of ethical practice holds the promise of unlocking whole fields of understanding that have remained largely confined to examples at best. This argument could well be extended to encompass the techne aspects of teaching, i.e. didactics, where the systematic documentation and analysis of didactical stories is largely absent. For instance, the Waldorf curriculum specifies a number of so-called main-lesson blocks, each of which has a focused theme over the course of two to four weeks. Thus there is, for example, a block devoted to classical Greek history and culture in 5th grade. This block is well described in current Waldorf-educational literature regarding its contents, with ample examples. However, this is something entirely different from having 50 teachers talk about what they did, how they did it, what they considered innovative, and so on. That kind of systematic study would at once give access to an enacted curriculum rather than an intended one, would clarify the rich variety that exists in actual practice and begin to build a source of practice-based knowledge that is less ad-hoc than web-forums or books containing the personal examples of an experienced teacher. Furthermore, this would provide the opportunity for exploration into patterns, issues and problems as well as potentials with part of a curriculum.
At this juncture I will move on to introduce some sample narratives in order to demonstrate some of the ways in which these conceptual considerations become concrete.

6. Three forms of narrative
I will discuss here three forms of narrative called provisionally the episodic narrative, the process narrative and the biographical narrative. The last, the biographical one, is quite brief here because I have discussed it at length in my recent licentiate thesis (2015a).

Narratives of episodes
In the first form, the narrative describes a process of deliberation and action within a self-contained episode. I have included here a short narrative from a teacher-student at the fritidslärarn-program at WLH (fritidslärare is the Swedish term for after-school teachers who work and teach at fritids which is usually translated as after-school center). The program is part-time and most of the teacher-students work at fritids while studying solving the issue of providing sufficient practice in training. The narrative came out of an assignment during work on describing a conflict-resolution situation. It is part of a collection of about fifteen such stories. A more extensive analysis and discussion is in preparation.

The pocket mirror
At our fritids we have a boy we can call Olle. He's in third grade. He's the kind of boy that one knows is at fritids when he's there. Both teachers and children find him disturbing (he yells and makes a lot of noise) and he often disrupts activities and play through his way of being and acting. This time, he had taken a small pocket mirror from a girl and refused to return it. The girl herself did not come to get me, but sent another girl who complained that Olle had taken the other girl’s pocket mirror. She asked me to come help get it back. I went into the room close by where Olle sat, followed by a tail of children who were keen on seeing what was going to happen. There was considerable tension in the air, since this wasn't a unique occurrence and it is always exiting to see how the staff deals with such situations.

   I sat down next to Olle, breathed out and said:
   Hi Olle! Do you like mirrors?
   Olle: Yes I do.
   Me: Do you have any mirrors of your own?
   Olle: Yes, but it’s huge. (He gets up and measures with his hands and judging by the size it must be a wall mirror)
   Me: Wow, that’s a large mirror!
   Olle: Yes.
   Me: Yes, it would look pretty funny if you came to school on your bike with that under your arm (laughing kindly).
   Olle looks happy, then he gets up and gives the girl back her pocket mirror on his own accord without my saying anything more. All the children looking on seem satisfied and after that things return to normal. At the end of the day I notice that Olle once again has the girl's mirror and he notices me noticing. I don't say anything but he understands anyway that I am curious about the mirror. He says that he got it from the girl and she confirms. She thought he could have it since he didn't have one and she had several at home.
Some reflections

This narrative contains elements of moral technique, imagination and intuition that I will refrain from discussing more extensively in this paper. However, if used as part of a reflective curriculum in education it needs to be discussed together with other ones that cover a similar theme: that of not intervening directly in a conflict-riddled situation but, through various measures, encouraging those involved to solve it. Instead of scolding the boy or otherwise forcing him to face the actual problem head on, the teacher attends to the boy’s interest in mirrors, allows him to work through his action on his own and opens a space where he can do this without feeling threatened. In this case, the presence of the other children allows them also to become aware of something he is feeling, which opens a space for the girl from whom the mirror was taken to turn around and give it to him. On the one hand, we need to articulate and reflect on what is happening in order to be clear about how we understand a narrative (and my brief reflections do not suffice in practice, but only serve to indicate the kind of attention we need). On the other hand, narratives such as the above also function as sources for moral imagination if we are able to make use of them to enrich our own educational practice. For an experienced practitioner, it might be enough to have the one narrative because experience makes it transparent to the imagination and intuition underlying it. It is similar to being an experienced craftsperson and hearing about a new technique or being presented with a new tool. The experience one has embeds that new tool in a context and allows one to more or less seamlessly integrate it into one’s practice. For someone with less experience, a thematic variation is a way of overcoming literalness, to help one become aware of the variety of ways in which an intuition can be actualized through imagination.

Finally, for purposes of research, I am arguing that there is hardly any systematic empirical work here. What do we really know about the various ways in which teachers deal with conflict through non-direct interventions? I am sure that there are scores of textbooks where one can find discussions about such interventions as conflict-resolution measures, together with one or two very good examples. Again, the point here is that unless we have before us, say, fifty or a hundred stories such as the one above, what we know is really the intuitive or form/cognitive side. But that is not what I would term systematic, verbalized, practical knowledge. With crafts, it is different, since students/craftspeople produce something that speaks in itself, leaving a trace that is intersubjective. Like a chair, a book or a haircut. Other practitioners have access to these and can learn from them long after their creators have moved on (perhaps with the exception of haircuts, which don’t last that long, for obvious reasons). When it comes to phronesis and moral virtue, what we know and can share is only that which we partake in through experience and that which we are told of through stories. This means that even the more experienced among us are confined to comparatively narrow worlds unless we have come to share in the stories of others. Such storytelling needs to be systematically cultivated among teachers, and the best of them need to be documented for posterity.

Processes as curricula transparent to practical wisdom and Bildung

In the second form, the narrative does not so much describe a self-contained episode, but rather a larger pedagogical process stretching across a longer time span. I present here a narrative from an older study on the supportive crafts at the Kristoffer-school, Sweden’s oldest Waldorf school, where one of the teachers remembers a student from upper secondary school who was sent to him because he had some trouble in school and needed a change of scenery (I have a more extensive description of the use of supportive crafts at the Kristoffer-school to help students with various problems in my Masters thesis (Tyson 2011)).

Building a boat (told by a bookbinder)

The whole thing started with a friend of the school giving the students a riverboat, a large Verona that inspired all the craftspeople working with us. And it started with something similar:

I asked him: “What do you want to do?”

“Nothing.”
“Isn’t there something you’d like to do?”
“Well, I would like to build a boat.”
“Ok, then that’s what we’ll do.”
“What?! I can’t, I won’t be able to.”
“We’ll do it together.”

And suddenly he gets excited, starts talking about it with people, talks about the impossible that he is going to do, and the further he gets, the more amazing they think it is. Then, suddenly, he becomes silent because no one knows how to do it. Then he starts looking to find someone who can show him how to rivet. He becomes innovative, looks for tips, and someone suggests that “my dad knows someone who works with this and that…” Suddenly, his shyness is all gone. One parent happens to know someone who has built two boats. All of his introverted shyness, his attitude of: “I’ll never be able to,” is all gone, and he calls the man, agrees to meet, and then calls me to ask if he can borrow the keys to the workshops.

“What do you want the key for?”
“Well, Gellerstedt is going to come help me rivet, but his only free time is Sunday morning.” Sunday morning! If four or six weeks earlier, you had told him that he would be in school on a Sunday, he would have looked at you with pity and said: “right, tell me that other one about Snow White and the seven dwarves while you’re at it.” You can imagine a project like that: suddenly it is about so much more than just the boat, suddenly it is about navigation. The young man goes on to learn how to navigate, and I told him that I had a brilliant background in navigation. My first encounter with the Swedish archipelago was when I came here from Germany and [went sailing], and I didn’t arrive where I expected because the water looked the same everywhere. So in the morning, about four thirty, I met a fisherman and asked him where I was, and he said: “don’t you have a maritime map?” “Yes, yes I have a maritime map,” and he looked at it and said: “if it were about half a meter longer you would be here…”

Further reflections

The value of these narratives is the way in which a larger educational process is capable of articulating an enacted curriculum. Episodic narratives focus mostly on communication between participants in a situation. They involve the context to some degree, but not as overtly. We might call the ones considered here “curriculum-narratives”, in the sense that they illustrate more explicitly how a curriculum (including environment, tasks, etc.) supports a process of Bildung and wise deliberation. If the theme of the first narrative was communicative non-direct intervention in a conflict situation, the theme of the above narrative is a Bildung-related intervention aiming at human flourishing (eudaimonia). It is an intense ethical imperative that education should be a process of Bildung, bringing with it processes of biographical healing or the restoration of biographical integrity (Biesta, 2013; Tyson, 2011). Such Bildung processes are difficult to surface outside of longer, biographical accounts since Bildung is a predominantly biographical matter. By collecting a wide variety of narratives focusing on curriculum and Bildung, these aspects of practical knowledge can become more and more systematically explored.

Bildung-biographies

In the third form, these narratives and episodes become part of a larger biographical story where excellence in teaching turns into an aspect of the Bildung-process that the person has experienced (cf. Tyson, 2015). Such larger Bildung narratives provide a view as to what all of these issues come to mean in the life of a person. From an educational perspective, they afford perhaps the most direct view of how teacher education institutional curricula are experienced. It is also here that such research overlaps most extensively with matters of lifelong learning, where it can be argued that self-directed lifelong learning represents a significant goal in
education for human flourishing. The environments, curricula, culture, traditions, etc. that tend to support lifelong learning also need to be brought to light and discussed in a systematic fashion.

7. What does this imply for teacher education?

First, given the practical character of major parts of teacher knowledge, it cannot be taught to students of education, but only practiced by them and assisted through what Donald Schön calls “coaching” (1987). This calls for various apprenticeship models for teacher education, or extended practicums, as well as practice through mutual staging of teaching situations and the like.

Second, given that there is a heart of Waldorf educational thought that is primarily akin to moral intuition (what I would call the pedagogical intuitions of Allgemeine Menschenkunde for example), it is a matter of constructing a bridge between the ideas in Steiner’s educational lectures and the practice emanating from the Waldorf curriculum. The construction of this bridge is, to a significant degree, aided by narratives of practice.

Third, given the centrality of moral/pedagogical imagination for teachers, aesthetic activities in training - especially ones aiming at developing the capacity to think and express oneself in narratives - are significant and need systematic scholarly attention.

Fourth, situational practice and general intuition are illuminated through shared, reflective, narrative work, where one of the finest qualities of academic training can become fruitful: the striving for reflection that is done in a systematic and intersubjective fashion.

Fifth, a systematic scholarly collection of narratives relating to pedagogical imagination that reflects unusual success across different institutions, times and cultures holds the potential to illuminate and question local practices without establishing a single dominant “best practice” paradigm.
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